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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Brandon Tyler Eddins appeals from the judgment of conviction and 
restitution order entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of aggravated 
assault and of being a persistent violator of the law. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
While driving to his girlfriend's grandmother's house, Daniel Hight saw 
Eddins, who had been harassing Daniel and his girlfriend. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.1B, L.20 
- p.21, L.2.1) In an attempt to avoid a conflict, Daniel drove past Eddins and 
around the block, but Eddins chased after him. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.20, L.2 - p.21, 
L.17.) "[S]ick of' being harassed, Daniel stopped the car and got out to confront 
Eddins. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.21, L.1B - p.22, L.14.) Within seconds of Daniel exiting 
the car, Eddins "got in [Daniel's] face" and "hit [him] in the eye with a bottle of 
acid." (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.22, L.12 - p.23, L.2; see also Tr., Vol. 1 , p.24, Ls.1-2, p.43, 
Ls.1-5, p.51, L.16 - p.53, L.7, p.59, Ls.15-20, p.60, Ls.16-25.) The acid 
permeated Daniel's eye, resulting in what Daniel's ophthalmologist characterized 
as the "worst chemical injury" he had ever seen. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.115, Ls.6-9.) 
Despite the best efforts of physicians, Daniel's eye never recovered and, 
ultimately, it had to be surgically removed. (Tr., Vol.1, p.26, Ls.6-15, p.27, L.B-
1 The appellate record contains several separately bound volumes of transcripts. 
For uniformity and ease of reference, the state has adopted the numbering and 
citation system used by Eddins in his Appellant's brief. (See Appellant's brief, 
p.1 n.1 (designating the separately bound transcripts by volume number).) 
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p.28, L.5, p.111, L.16 - p.114, L.14, p.116, L.16 - p.121, L.25, p.135, L.11 -
p.137, L.25.) 
The state charged Eddins with aggravated battery (by means of corrosive 
acid and/or a caustic chemical), with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., 
pp.83-85, 172-73.) At trial, Eddins testified and admitted that he was carrying a 
bottle of acid on the night in question. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.174, Ls.4-14, p.176, L.18-
p.177, L.5.) He also admitted to having threatened Daniel during their 
confrontation, telling him to "back off, man, I have acid." (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.171, LS.6-
8, p.176, L.22 - p.177, L.1.) He denied having intentionally hit Daniel with the 
acid, however, maintaining instead that Daniel pushed the bottle of acid out of 
his hands, causing it to spill acid on both of them. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.170, L.19 -
p.172, L.8, p.172, L.24-p.173, L.7, p.173, Ls.17-21, p.177, Ls.6-9.) 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Eddins not 
guilty of aggravated battery, but guilty of aggravated assault and of being a 
persistent violator. (R., pp.249-51.) The district court entered judgment on the 
jury's verdict and imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with six years fixed. 
(R., pp.327-30.) Over Eddins' objection, the court also ordered Eddins to pay 
restitution in the amount of $5,241.79 to the victim's crime fund, to compensate it 
for the medical expenses it had paid on Daniel's behalf. (Tr., Vo1.3, p.28, L.18 -
p.29, L.16, p.40, L.13 - p.41, L.1; R., pp.328-29, 339-40; PSI, p.3.) Eddins 
timely appeals. (R., pp.343-45.) 
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ISSUES 
Eddins states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
misrepresenting or mischaracterizing the evidence in her 
closing argument? 
2. Whether the district court improperly awarded restitution for 
damages not caused by Mr. Eddins's culpable conduct. 
(Appellant's brief, p.5 (punctuation original).) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Eddins failed to show fundamental error with respect to his 
unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct? 
2. Has Eddins failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
requiring Eddins to pay restitution for the victim's economic losses that 
were proximately caused by Eddins' criminal conduct? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Eddins Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His 
Unpreserved Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Eddins argues the prosecutor committed 
misconduct amounting to fundamental error. SpecificaJly, he contends that, in 
closing argument, the prosecutor made statements that both mischaracterized 
the evidence and improperly appealed to the jurors' emotions. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.6-9.) Eddins' argument fails; a review of the challenged statements shows no 
misconduct, much less misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where, as here, a defendant fails to timely object at trial to allegedly 
improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set aside for 
prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that the alleged 
misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209,228,245 P.3d 961,980 (2010). 
C. Eddins Has Failed To Show Any Misconduct, Much Less Misconduct 
Rising To The Level Of Fundamental Error 
An unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes 
fundamental error." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 
(Ct. App. 2010). In the absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to 
remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the 
defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right 
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to a fair trial in a fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 
976 (2010). Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant 
demonstrates that "one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights 
were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, 
"without the need for any additional information" including information "as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must 
demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally 
by showing a reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the 
trial proceedings." 19.:. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
Eddins was charged with aggravated battery. (R., pp.83-85, 172-73.) In 
arguing to the jury that it should find Eddins guilty of that charge, the prosecutor 
twice reminded the jury of the severity of the injury Daniel Hight sustained as a 
result of having acid thrown on him. Specifically, the prosecutor opened her 
closing argument by stating: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, when I spoke with you 
yesterday morning, I told you that at the end of this trial, you would 
have the information in front of you on how Daniel Hight lost one of 
his most importance [sic] senses, how he lost his left eye and he 
lost his sense of sight. 
(Tr., Vo1.2, p.140, L.24 - p.141, LA.) Then, after discussing at length the 
elements of aggravated battery and the evidence that supported each of those 
elements (Tr., Vo1.2, p.141, L.5 - p.148, L.23), the prosecutor concluded her 
closing argument by stating: 
The acid used on Daniel Hight's eye on July 11th changed 
his life. He has lost his sight, and he has lost his eye. Based on all 
of the testimony and the evidence you have in front of you now, 
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you have enough to find the defendant guilty of aggravated battery. 
Thank you. 
(Tr., Vo1.2, p.148, L.24 - p.149, L.4). 
Eddins did not object to the prosecutor's arguments below, but he 
contends on appeal that, by arguing to the jury that Daniel "lost his sense of 
sight," the prosecutor "misrepresented the evidence and improperly appealed to 
the jurors' emotions.,,2 (Appellant's brief, p.6 (capitalization altered, underlining 
omitted).) Eddins' argument is without merit; he has failed to show that the 
complained of statements were improper, much less that they rose to the level of 
fundamental error. 
A prosecutor has considerable latitude in closing argument. State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009); State v. Porter, 130 
Idaho 772,786,948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6,14,909 
P .2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1995). He or she is entitled to argue all reasonable 
inferences from the evidence in the record. Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 215 
P.3d at 440; Porter, 130 Idaho at 786, 948 P.2d at 141 (citing State v. Garcia, 
100 Idaho 108, 110, 594 P.2d 146, 148 (1979)). Appeals to the emotion, 
passion, or prejudice of the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics are 
impermissible. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 
2 Eddins consistently cites "Tr., Vo1.2, p.119, L.25; Tr., Vo1.2, p.148, L.25" as 
support for his assertion that the prosecutor argued to the jury that Daniel had 
"lost his sense of sight." (See Appellant's brief, pp.3, 8.) While the state 
acknowledges the prosecutor twice stated Daniel had lost "his sense of sight" 
(see Tr., Vo1.2, p.116, Ls.20-23, p.141, Ls.2-4), she did not do so at either 
portion of the transcript cited by Eddins in his Appellant's brief (see Tr., Vo1.2, 
p.119, L.25 (defense counsel speaking), p.148, L.25 (prosecutor arguing: "July 
11th changed his life. He has lost his sight, and")). 
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2007). Nor maya prosecutor "attempt[] to secure a verdict on any factor other 
than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during 
trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence," as 
doing so, "impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227,245 P.3d at 979. 
Contrary to Eddins' claims on appeal, the prosecutor's statements in this 
case - that Daniel Hight "lost his sense of sight" and/or "lost his sight" - were 
neither false nor an impermissible appeal to the emotions of the jury. Daniel 
testified that, after Eddins hit him in the eye with the bottle of acid, he was unable 
to see out of that eye, that he never regained vision in his eye, and that, despite 
weeks of treatment, doctors were unable to save it. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.24, Ls.1-2, 
p.25, Ls.18-21, p.26, Ls.9-17.) Daniel's ophthalmologist likewise testified that he 
was unable to save Daniel'S eye and, ultimately, it had to be surgically removed. 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.111, L.16 - p.114, L.14, p.116, L.16 - p.121, L.25.) In light of the 
fact that the evidence showed Daniel actually lost one of his eyes as a result of 
the acid attack, the prosecutor's statements that Daniel "lost his sense of sight" 
and/or "lost his sight" were entirely accurate, at least as to the eye Daniel lost. In 
fact, each time the prosecutor referred in her closing argument to Daniel having 
"lost his sense of sight" or "lost his sight," she also stated in the same breath that 
Daniel had lost only one of his eyes. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.141, Ls.2-4 ("he lost his 
left eye and he lost his sense of sight), p.148, L.25 - p.149, L.1 ("He has lost his 
sight, and he has lost his eye.").) That the prosecutor did not also specifically 
articulate what was already obvious to the jury (both from having observed 
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Daniel on the witness stand and from having heard him testify) - i.e., that Daniel 
still had vision in his remaining eye - does not show any misrepresentation or 
embellishment by the prosecutor in an attempt to bolster the state's case. 
Nor does it show any attempt by the prosecutor to secure a guilty verdict 
by appealing to the jurors' emotions. Eddins was charged with aggravated 
battery. To prove that charge, the state was required to prove, inter alia, that 
Eddins "unlawfully and intentionally caus[ed] bodily harm to" Daniel. (Compare 
R., p.264 (Jury Instruction No.1 0) with I.C. § 18-903.) Pointing out that Eddins 
actually lost his eye and, thus, his "sense of sight" or "sight" in that eye goes 
directly to the element of crime that required the state to prove an injury. 
Because the prosecutor's statements were based on the evidence and related 
directly to an element of the crime the state was required to prove, Eddins has 
failed to show any error at all, much less error of constitutional significance. His 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct thus fails on first prong of the Perry 
fundamental error analysis. 
Even assuming Eddins could overcome the first prong of the Perry test for 
fundamental error, his claim of prosecutorial misconduct nevertheless fails on 
the second prong of the test, which requires Eddins to demonstrate that the error 
he asserts is "clear or obvious" on the record. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226,245 P.3d 
at 978. Eddins argues the error is "plain from the face of the record" because 
"the prosecutor's statement that Mr. Hight had 'lost his sense sight' [sic] was 
blatantly wrong, and could only serve to appeal to the passions of the jury." 
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, however, the 
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complained-of statements were both supported by the evidence and relevant to 
an element of the charged crime. Perhaps more importantly as it relates to the 
"clear and obvious" prong of Perry, it appears from the record that, to the extent 
defense counsel below believed there was anything improper about the 
prosecutor's statements, he deliberately chose to forego an objection and opted 
instead to address the prosecutor's remarks in his own closing argument. 
Specifically, defense counsel argued: 
Now, ladies and gentlemen, we saw a lot of pictures, a lot of 
doctor testimony about what happened to Mr. Hight's eye. And the 
State is trying to appeal through emotions. They want to appeal to 
your sympathies. We all feel bad for Mr. Hight. This is a tragic 
accident. Who would not feel bad for him? But that's just what this 
was, an accident. And tragedy does not equal intentional. 
The State is trying to make you feel bad for Mr. Hight by 
saying he lost one of his five senses; and based on that sympathy 
alone, they want you to convict Mr. Eddins. But look at the 
evidence. Look at the facts. Remember and recall what the 
witnesses said. 
(Tr., Vo1.2, p.154, Ls.12-24.) Because the record clearly shows defense counsel 
chose, as a matter of trial strategy, to respond to the prosecutor's statements 
rather than object to them, Eddins' claim that the error he asserts for the first 
time on appeal is meets the "clear and obvious" prong of Perry necessarily fails. 
See Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 226, 245 P.3d at 976, 978 ("[R]equiring a 
contemporaneous objection prevents the litigant from sandbagging the court, i.e., 
remaining silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error only if the 
case does not conclude in his favor"; to that end, a defendant fails to meet the 
second prong of Perry if there is even a "reasonable possibility" defense 
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counsel's failure to object was tactical. (Citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
Finally, Eddins has failed to show he was actually prejudiced by the 
prosecutor's statements that, as a result of the acid attack, Daniel "lost his sense 
of sight" or "lost his sight." For the reasons already stated, the statements were 
proper and did not appeal to the jury to decide the case on anything other than 
the evidence presented. Even assuming, however, that the statements could be 
construed in a vacuum as having embellished the facts or improperly appealed 
to the jurors' emotions, there is no reason to believe the result of the trial would 
have been any different. Because Daniel Hight testified at trial, the jury was able 
to personally observe the extent of his injury and was thus aware that Daniel was 
still able to see out of his remaining eye. Moreover, the trial court specifically 
instructed the jury that it was to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, 
not on the arguments of counsel. (R., p.258 (Jury Instruction No.4).) Assuming, 
as this Court must, that the jury followed the court's instruction, State v. 
Grantham, 146 Idaho 490,498, 198 P.3d 128, 136 (Ct. App. 2008), there is no 
reasonable possibility the jury was influenced by the prosecutor's remarks to 
render a verdict based on sympathy or any other improper factor. Finally, and 
most importantly, the jury actually acquitted Eddins of aggravated battery and 
found instead that he was guilty only of the lesser included crime of aggravated 
assault, a crime that does not require proof of any injury whatsoever. (Compare 
R., p.266 (Jury Instruction No. 12) with I.C. § 18-901.) Had the jury actually been 
swayed by the prosecutor's argument to decide the case based on emotion or 
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sympathy for the victim, it surely would have made the finding, necessary for an 
aggravated battery conviction, that Eddins actually used force or violence on 
and/or injured the victim. (Compare R., p.264 (Jury Instruction No.1 0) with I.C. 
§ 18-903.) 
Eddins has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating fundamental error 
with respect to his unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct. This Court 
should therefore decline to review the claim for the first time on appeal. 
II. 
Eddins Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering 
Him To Pay Restitution For The Victim's Economic Losses That Were Actually 
And Proximately Caused By Eddins' Criminal Conduct 
A. Introduction 
The district court ordered Eddins to pay restitution in the amount of 
$5,241.79 to cover the medical expenses Daniel Hight incurred as a result of the 
chemical burn to his eye. (R., pp.328-29, 339-40.) Eddins challenges the 
restitution award, arguing as he did below that, because the jury only found him 
guilty of aggravated assault, rather than of aggravated battery, "the only culpable 
action for which it could have convicted Mr. Eddins was making a threat," and 
"[s]ince the threat - the words themselves - are incapable of causing physical 
injury, the restitution award for losses related to Mr. Hight's physical injury is 
erroneous." (Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) Eddins' argument is without merit. A 
review of the record and the applicable law supports the district court's 
determination that the injury to Daniel's eye was caused by Eddins' criminal 
conduct and, as such, Eddins is responsible for Daniel's medical expenses. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed 
to the trial court's discretion. State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, _, 296 P.3d 412, 
417 (Ct. App. 2013); State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 78, 253 P.3d 750, 752 (Ct. 
App. 2010); State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114, 190 P.3d 930, 933 (Ct. App. 
2008). The trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will not be 
disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 
_, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013); State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 
398, 401 (2011). 
C. Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court's Finding That The 
Victim's Injury Was Caused By Eddins' Criminal Conduct 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes a court to "order a defendant found 
guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make 
restitution to the victim." For purposes of Idaho's restitution statute, a "victim" 
includes any "person or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result 
of the defendant's criminal conduct." I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(i) (emphasis added). 
"Economic loss" includes, among other things, "the value of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed ... and ... medical expenses resulting 
from the criminal conduct." I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) (emphasis added). "Therefore, 
in order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be a causal connection 
between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries 
suffered by the victim." State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 
(2011); accord State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, _, 296 P.3d 412, 418 (Ct. App. 
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2013); State v. Nienburg, 153· Idaho 491, _, 283 P.3d 808, 811 (Ct. App. 
2012); State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387,391,271 P.3d 1243, 1247 (Ct. App. 
2012). 
As recently reiterated by the Idaho Supreme Court, "causation consists of 
actual cause and true proximate cause." Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 
401 (citing State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374, 223 P.3d 750, 757 (2009)). 
The Court articulated the distinction between actual and proximate cause as 
follows: 
"Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event 
produced a particular consequence. [Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374, 
223 P.3d at 757] (quoting [Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875, 
204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009)]). The "but for" test is used in 
circumstances where there is only one actual cause or where two 
or more possible causes were not acting concurrently. Id. On the 
other hand, true proximate cause deals with "whether it was 
reasonably foreseeable that such harm would flow from the 
negligent conduct." Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204 
P.3d at 515). In analyzing proximate cause, this Court must 
determine whether the injury and manner of occurrence are so 
highly unusual "that a reasonable person, making an inventory of 
the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would 
not have reasonably expected the injury to occur." Id. (quoting 
Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875,204 P.3d at 515). 
Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401. See also Cottrell, 152 Idaho at 392, 
271 P.3d at 1248. The determinations of actual cause and proximate cause are 
both factual questions. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401; Cottrell, 152 
Idaho at 392, 271 P.3d at 1248. 
Applying the two-part causation inquiry to the facts before it, the Corbus 
Court upheld an award of restitution for injuries sustained by the victim when he 
jumped out of Corbus' vehicle in the course of a police chase. 150 Idaho at 602-
13 
06, 401-05. Regarding actual cause, the Court found that, but for "Corbus' acts 
of driving recklessly and eluding police officers and then failing to stop in 
response to their overhead emergency lights," the victim "would not have needed 
to" jump from the vehicle. kL at 603, 249 P.3d at 402. The Court also found 
proximate cause existed because, based on the evidence that showed "Corbus 
had created an extremely dangerous situation for his passenger by driving at 
night, at excessive speeds, with no headlights on ... , it was reasonably 
foreseeable that his passenger would decide to jump from the vehicle to avoid a 
potentially serious car accident." Id. at 605, 249 P.3d at 404. 
More recently, in Cottrell, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals upheld an 
award of restitution to the police officer victim for a knee injury he sustained 
when he attempted to restrain Cottrell while Cottrell actively resisted and 
obstructed the officer's attempt to arrest him. 152 Idaho at 390-94, 271 P.3d at 
1246-50. The Court concluded that actual cause was "satisfied because the 
evidence show[ed] it was Cottrell's acts of attempting to pull away from [the 
officer] during arrest that precipitated the need for [the officer] to gain control of 
Cottrell and, in so doing, twist his knee." kL at 393, 271 P.3d at 1249 (footnote 
omitted). The Court also found proximate cause, reasoning it was reasonably 
foreseeable, based on Cottrell's repeated failures to obey the officer's requests 
and submit to arrest, "that Cottrell's conduct would elicit a physical response 
from [the officer], putting [the officer] in a position to injure his knee." kL 
As in Corbus and Cottrell, a review of the evidence in this case supports 
the district court's award of restitution and, more specifically, its finding that the 
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injury to Daniel's eye was caused by Eddins' criminal conduct. The uncontested 
evidence at trial showed Daniel lost his eye as a result of a chemical burn 
caused by an extremely caustic acid. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.111, 16 - p.122, L.14, p.135, 
L.11 - p.137, L.25.) Both Daniel and Eddins testified that the acid belonged to 
Eddins, and he was carrying it with him in a plastic bottle on the night in 
question. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.22, L.23 - p.23, L.2, p.24, Ls.1-7, p.25, Ls.3-17, p.174, 
Ls.7-14, p.176, Ls.18-24, p.177, Ls.2-5.) Daniel testified that he originally 
attempted to avoid a confrontation with Eddins by driving around the block, but 
Eddins chased after him and they ended up in the same alley. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.20, 
L.2 - p.21, L.17.) A confrontation then ensued, during which, Eddins admitted, 
he was still holding the bottle of acid. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.21, L.24 - p.22, L.19, p.175, 
Ls.18-24, p.177, Ls.4-5.) Eddins also admitted to having threatened Daniel 
during the confrontation, telling him to "back off, man, I have acid." (Tr., Vol. 1 , 
p.171, Ls.6-8, p.176, L.24 - p.1.) Daniel testified that Eddins struck him in the 
eye with the bottle of acid. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.22, L.12 - p.23, L.2, p.24, Ls.1-2, p.43, 
Ls.1-5.) Eddins denied this and testified Daniel pushed the bottle of acid out of 
his hands, causing it to spill acid on both of them. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.170, L.19 -
p.172, L.8, p.172, L.24 - p.173, L.7, p.173, Ls.17-21, p.177, Ls.6-9.) 
Regardless, the undisputed evidence showed the acid Eddins was carrying 
ended up in Daniel's eye, irreparably injuring it. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.25, L.18 - p.28, 
L.4, p.111, L.16 - p.114, L.14, p.116, L.16 - p.121, L.24, p.135, L.11 - p.137, 
L.25, p.177, Ls.6-9.) At a minimum this evidence shows that, were it not for 
Eddins' acts of pursuing Daniel while carrying the bottle of acid and, ultimately, 
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threatening Daniel with it, Daniel would never have been in a position to be 
struck by the acid that injured his eye. Actual cause is thus satisfied in this case. 
There is also sUbstantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's 
implicit finding that Eddins' criminal conduct was the proximate cause of the 
injury to Daniel's eye. In opposing the state's restitution request, defense 
counsel argued below that Eddins should not be held responsible for Daniel's 
medical expenses because the jury, by finding Eddins guilty of aggravated 
assault instead of aggravated battery, necessarily found that Eddins only 
"threat[ened] to commit violence with the caustic acid," not that he actually 
caused the injury. (Tr., Vo1.3, p.28, L.18 - p.29, L.16.) The district court rejected 
this argument, concluding that the medical expenses Daniel incurred as a result 
of the injury to his eye "clearly flow[ed] from the criminal conduct that Mr. Eddins 
was found guilty of." (Tr., Vo1.3, pAD, L.16 - p.41, L.1.) The district court was 
correct. The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict shows 
Eddins armed himself with a bottle of acid, sought out a confrontation with Daniel 
and then, during that confrontation, threatened Daniel with the acid. Given 
Eddins' extremely reckless conduct in carrying the bottle of acid in the first place, 
it was reasonably foreseeable that Daniel or Eddins or both would be injured by 
the acid Eddins himself threatened to use. 
On appeal, Eddins merely reiterates the argument he made below, 
contending he is not responsible for Daniel's injury, or the medical expenses 
related thereto, because, based on the jury verdict finding him guilty of 
aggravated assault, "the only culpable act for which [he] could possibly have 
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been convicted was making a threat with the apparent ability to carry out that 
threat." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) Eddins' argument is without merit. While the 
state agrees with Eddins that "the [threatening] words themselves ... did not 
cause the damage to Mr. Hight's eye" (Appellant's brief, p.13), Eddins' otherwise 
conclusory claim that it is not "foreseeable that the words spoken will be capable 
of impacting the physical world" (Id. (footnote omitted)) is simply not borne out by 
the law, common sense, or the record. 
The law dictates that crime victims are entitled to restitution for economic 
losses, including medical expenses, that are actually and proximately caused by 
the defendant's criminal conduct. I.C. § 19-5304; Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 
P.3d at 401. Common sense dictates that where a defendant makes a threat 
with apparent ability to carry it out, it is at least reasonably foreseeable that the 
threatened harm may come to fruition. A review of the record shows that is 
precisely what happened in this case. After Eddins threatened Daniel with the 
acid he was actually carrying on his person, Daniel was injured by the acid. 
Regardless of whether Eddins intentionally struck Daniel with the bottle of acid or 
only threatened to do so, it was a reasonably foreseeable result that Daniel or 
Eddins or both would be injured by the acid. 
Substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that the injury to 
Daniel's eye was caused by Eddins' criminal conduct. Eddins has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion in the restitution award. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction and order of restitution. 
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